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NO. 34 AUGUST 2018 Introduction 
Climate and Security Revisited 
Germany’s Priorities for the 2019/2020 UN Security Council Period 
Susanne Dröge 
Germany will hold a non-permanent seat on the UN Security Council in 2019 and 
2020, and has announced that climate fragility will be one of its priorities. However, 
the Council members’ interest in climate change and willingness to debate improving 
preparation for its security implications are very mixed. In continuing the follow-up 
to the Swedish-led debate of July 2018, Germany will face three challenges. First, 
adding value for all parties involved, the vulnerable developing countries as well as 
the permanent five countries in the Security Council. Second, matching ambitions 
with resources; in particular, Germany’s credibility as a climate policy leader needs 
to be maintained and engagement needs to be pushed at the highest level possible. 
Third, managing expectations on possible Security Council progress on this non-
traditional security issue in the next two years. Diplomatic efforts should improve 
information flows for countries suffering from climate change impacts, intensify 
connections across forums inside and outside the UN, and lay out what can actually 
be achieved through the Security Council. 
 
Political attention for security implications 
of climate change peaked for the first time 
in 2007. Extreme weather impacts on food 
and water supply, land losses due to sea 
level rise, and systemic issues such as 
changing precipitation patterns and melt-
ing polar icecaps are the most prominent 
phenomena. Their potential to create multi-
plier effects in conflict-prone regions was 
identified already early in the debate. 
Two areas have developed dynamically 
over the past decade. First, knowledge and 
data about climate change impacts on the 
natural environment and populations in 
several world regions has increased. Re-
searchers conducted increasing numbers 
of case studies and data-based evaluations, 
collated by the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC). Accordingly, more 
detailed information is available today 
when policymakers want to address specific 
security risks associated with climate-
related events. 
Second, political attention has grown 
steadily, starting with a UK-led initiative 
and the first debate in the UN Security 
Council (UNSC) in 2007. When it previously 
held a seat on the UNSC, Germany staged a 
debate in 2011 on climate-related security 
risks which concluded with a presidential 
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statement. The statement underlines that 
“adverse effects of climate change may, in 
the long run, aggravate certain existing 
threats to international peace and security”. 
Another debate followed in 2013, in an 
Arria-formula meeting of UNSC members 
where the need for rapid preventive action 
was stressed. Arria meetings are convened 
at the initiative of a UNSC member, but 
are not an official Security Council activity 
and thus enable frank and confidential 
exchanges. 
The G7 foreign ministers in 2013 estab-
lished a Working Group on Climate Change 
and Fragility. Under the German G7 presi-
dency 2015 a report was commissioned and 
a platform launched to address implications 
of particular climate-fragility risks like for 
example local resource competition, liveli-
hood insecurity and migration, extreme 
weather, and transboundary water manage-
ment. During 2017 and 2018, the Nether-
lands and Sweden followed up with UNSC 
debates on climate and security. 
In parallel, calls became louder to reform 
UN structures in order to advise policymakers 
on non-traditional security risks such as 
climate change impacts. This history sets 
the stage for the coming two years of Ger-
man engagement. 
Climate change in the UN 
system – UNFCC and UNSC 
With the Paris Agreement effective from 
2020, the international climate regime 
comprises rules on climate protection, 
adaptation to climate change, and irre-
versible losses and damage, and also in-
cludes financial assistance, capacity-
building and technology transfer. It took 
many years to get this far. The Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) 
began in 1994 with a clear focus on green-
house gas mitigation, based on an assump-
tion that the atmosphere will not have 
deteriorated to a point of unmanageable 
irreversibility by the end of the century. 
Policymakers in the 1990s also wanted to 
escape the fatalism inherent to thinking 
about adaptation and determination of 
losses and damages. They regarded miti-
gation as the top priority because it would 
have avoided the need to adapt. 
It has become clear, however, that these 
efforts did not suffice. Climate change is 
happening fast with considerable impacts 
already felt today, mostly but not exclusively 
in developing countries. 
A number of developing countries, the 
small island developing states (SIDS), are 
forced to take the consequences of climate 
impacts very seriously as they face threats 
to their territories, but lack the financial 
and institutional capacities to safeguard 
their interests. Since 2007 the SIDS have 
been demanding a forum for regular ex-
changes about threats from climate change. 
They regard the UNSC as a suitable place, 
where the developed countries, which con-
tributed most to climate change, could take 
responsibility for its effects. 
The appetite of UNSC members to ad-
dress non-traditional security risks is mixed, 
however. At the latest debate in July 2018, 
led by Sweden, three groups emerged. 
France, the United Kingdom, Côte-d’Ivoire, 
Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, the Nether-
lands, Poland, and Sweden, support estab-
lishing climate change as a matter of UNSC 
involvement. China, the United States, 
Kuwait, Peru, and Sudan were interested; 
Russia and Bolivia were outspokenly 
critical. 
The key players, however, are the five 
permanent members (P5: United States, 
Russia, China, United Kingdom, France). As 
they hold the power of veto, non-traditional 
security threats cannot be addressed in this 
forum without their support. Germany will 
join the UNSC, together with Belgium, the 
Dominican Republic, Indonesia and South 
Africa, in 2019, when the terms of Bolivia, 
Ethiopia, Kazakhstan, the Netherlands and 
Sweden will end. 
What is in the cards? 
The UNSC addresses acute security crises 
with the authority to intervene using mili-
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tary force. Preventive action is not included 
in its mandate. Yet, the links between cli-
mate and security are increasingly obvious 
and identifiable. References to these and to 
the need for risk assessments have entered 
some recent resolutions, the Lake Chad 
resolution (2017) and Darfur (renewed 2018) 
being prominent examples. 
Climate change research and impacts 
forecasts show that the extent and fre-
quency of extreme weather will increase 
and the global mean temperature will rise. 
The intensity of extreme events will vary, 
but will affect all UNSC member countries 
through first-, second- and third-order 
events. 
First-order events are measurable GHG 
impacts, for example on temperatures; 
water systems like glacial reservoirs in the 
Himalayas, Alps and Andes; sea level rise in 
all oceans, tornadoes and hurricanes hitting 
coast lines in Europe, the United States, 
China, and many other Asian countries; fre-
quency of flooding and drought; or changes 
in land quality and availability. The most 
extreme effect is the total loss of territory, 
which some low-lying island states antici-
pate in the event of unabated climate 
change (slow onset events). Second-order 
events affect security of supply, like loss 
of agricultural productivity and disruption 
of water resources (with catastrophic pro-
portions reached in the Lake Chad Basin). 
Such events are projected to occur more 
often. Migration is a third-order effect. If 
sources of income and sustenance dis-
appear, temporary migration can turn into 
permanent displacement within and across 
national borders. 
Thus, human security can be at risk on 
all three levels, with the actual magnitude 
depending on a whole range of other 
factors. 
Ethnic, territorial, political or socio-
economic conflict are the main drivers 
of outbreaks of violence on the national, 
regional and local levels. Changes in the 
natural environment influence these 
drivers, for instance opportunities to gen-
erate income. In the case of Lake Chad, 
once the largest lake in Africa, shared by 
Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria, there 
is even a link to terrorist groups. The lake’s 
dramatic decline means that agriculture 
and fishing can no longer guarantee in-
come, which in turn makes it easier for 
militias and terrorist groups to recruit 
young men. 
The reactions of natural systems to a 
warming climate develop over long periods, 
making it hard to identify and prepare for 
immediate threats. A study that looked into 
the 2007–2010 drought in the Fertile Cres-
cent with a focus on Syria illustrates how 
the consequences of rising temperatures 
become visible. The authors found that the 
severe drought cannot be explained by 
natural variability alone; local changes in 
precipitation are linked to a warming east-
ern Mediterranean. This long-term trend 
more than doubles the likelihood of 
droughts in the region. In Syria, this gen-
erated severe stress for farmers and live-
stock herders who suffered great losses. 
Many moved to the urban centres, adding 
to inflows of Iraqi refugees and contrib-
uting to a 50 percent expansion of the 
urban population in only eight years. These 
social strains and a lack of local resources 
contributed to political unrest. 
How to handle the risks? 
The effects of climate change events can be 
managed. But to do so, policymakers have 
to take decisions in anticipation of future 
incidents and different degrees of uncer-
tainty about scale. Both features demand a 
functioning governance system with strong 
and effective institutions. In many coun-
tries, such governance is rare or lacking. 
Accordingly, international and regional 
cooperation often is the only channel for 
mobilizing resources for populations in 
fragile environments suffering climate 
risks. This is where the adaptation agenda 
under the Paris Agreement has already en-
hanced international cooperation. Yet for 
international actors, ex post humanitarian 
aid is easier to legitimize than ex ante 
interventions. 
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Prevention 
First and foremost, foreign policy and devel-
opment cooperation provide measures to 
help vulnerable countries to avoid food and 
water scarcity, to reconstruct after extreme 
natural events, and to enhance their resili-
ence to a greater frequency and severity of 
extreme weather. 
The UN system covers all relevant aspects 
of prevention, but governance needs to 
be improved. New initiatives are emerging, 
based on the Sustainable Development 
Goals (SDGs) and the Paris Agreement. A 
UNDP report on climate resilience projects 
in Arab states shows how various SDGs (like 
poverty reduction, zero hunger, gender 
equality, clean water and sanitation, and 
peace, justice and strong institutions) can 
be supported through climate action and 
thus contribute to overall resilience, in par-
ticular against water stress. Together with 
the United Nations Environment Pro-
gramme (UNEP), the World Food Programme 
and other regional institutions, UNDP plans 
to launch an SDG-Climate Nexus Facility in 
2018, in a move to support bottom-up local 
actions by enabling investment, with 
shared benefits across the SDGs. More such 
approaches need to be pushed by key UN 
members. While they are unlikely to defuse 
the underlying security threats in regions 
with simmering tensions, for instance in 
Somalia or Yemen, they stand a good chance 
of avoiding additional threats from climate 
impacts. 
Preparation 
Rather than prevention, “preparedness” for 
climate-related risks has become the UNSC’s 
buzzword in the debate over its role. 
Security circles in general, and the Secu-
rity Council members China, Russia and the 
United States in particular, however, are 
cautious in relation to non-traditional risks 
and demands to prepare for them. There is 
good reason for this. The securitization of 
indirect drivers of conflict does not auto-
matically lead to solutions that are in the 
interest of all parties involved, nor does 
short-term intervention with military 
means resolve long-term structural risks 
in vulnerable situations. Thus it is under-
standable that many countries are also 
skeptical about granting the UNSC a climate 
mandate. 
Stronger and more visible connectivity 
with the climate agenda between UN insti-
tutions that function at the preventive end 
could divert some of the demands placed 
on the UNSC. Nevertheless, there is also 
reason enough to establish more systematic 
preparedness for future risks. Attempts to 
implement better and more innovative fore-
sight exist for instance for strategic develop-
ment assistance planning at the UN level. 
Risk cultures and framing of 
climate security 
The US Department of Defense (DoD) 
frames climate change impacts as a matter 
of national security and has stepped up its 
activities. US military operations inside and 
outside the United States experience directly 
how climate change could play out, for 
example by aggravating security of supply 
at US bases hit by extreme weather or by 
melting permafrost in the Arctic region. 
Based on a 2015 DoD report on climate-
related risks, the Pentagon announced it 
would integrate climate impacts into its 
planning cycles and conduct vulnerability 
assessments. Senior defence officials in the 
current administration have continued this 
pragmatic approach. The National Defense 
Authorization Act (NDAA) adopted by Con-
gress in 2017 and signed by President 
Trump includes spending to prepare the 
military for climate-related impacts. Trump 
signed the 2019 NDAA in August 2018, 
continuing this approach with a stronger 
focus on installations in the Arctic. 
In Europe, preparedness and planning 
for climate-related risks differs consider-
ably. The 2008 Solana/Ferrero-Waldner 
report showed little military-related inter-
est, but rather the perception that risks 
would increase in non-European region and 
affect the EU’s foreign relations and devel-
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opment policy. The European Council ac-
cordingly prioritized cooperation with third 
countries and regions regarding the inter-
national security implications of climate 
change. 
Ten years later, the EU approach is little 
changed. The climate diplomacy agenda 
of the EU Foreign Affairs Council takes a 
holistic approach, integrating climate into 
the European External Action Service 
(EEAS) mandate. In June 2018 at a high-
level event in Brussels, EU High Repre-
sentative Federica Mogherini laid out three 
EU policy priorities: climate protection as 
the best way to prevent conflicts, climate 
diplomacy to address the risks together 
with partners, and investment in technol-
ogies like satellite systems to inform coun-
tries on weather impacts. The top concern 
for the EU is displacement of people by 
natural disasters. 
That reluctance to frame climate risks as 
a matter for national security policy is also 
shared by the German government, and 
hinders direct connection to US interests. 
The 2016 white paper on German security 
policy recognizes climate change as a phe-
nomenon, but fails to deliver any deeper 
analyses or a statement on the role of Ger-
many’s future defence policy. Although 
the report focuses on early warning of up-
coming crises, it limits itself to referring the 
issue of climate fragility to international 
forums and organizations like the G7, the 
UN and the EU, or to development policy. 
Germany in the UNSC 
Its non-permanent seat on the UNSC in 
2019 and 2020 gives the German govern-
ment the opportunity to follow up on this 
priority and to further promote the cred-
ibility of the process. For this, first, the cli-
mate risks debates and initiatives that have 
developed in the UNSC-context since 2011 
need to be consolidated. Second, any sug-
gestion on handling country-specific climate 
fragility in the UNSC needs to be matched 
with the diverging interests of the P5 in 
conflict-prone regions, for instance in 
Africa. Seeking dialogue also with the criti-
cal countries like Russia and Bolivia is nec-
essary. 
Third, Germany initiated a Group of 
Friends on Climate and Security on 1 August 
2018, co-chaired with Nauru and consisting 
of twenty-seven UN member states, the 
majority of which are vulnerable islands 
and other developing countries. The group 
is an important diplomatic means of inten-
sifying and focusing the debate in New 
York. It can help to sound out ideas on how 
to bring climate-related issues to the UNSC, 
to involve critical members and to deepen 
and broaden the understanding of the 
climate-fragility risks. 
Next steps 
Improving credibility 
Giving direction and shaping an agenda 
in New York will have to go hand in hand 
with other German climate policy activities. 
Germany is expected to perform as an 
integral facilitator in the UN system and in 
other forums like the G7. France will host 
the G7 summit in 2019 and is a reliable 
partner for pushing climate issues in this 
setting, as well as in New York. 
Moreover, expectations on national 
development policy, the UNDP agenda, and 
matters such as UNEP’s intensified work on 
transboundary water crises will need to be 
matched by German and EU commitment. 
In particular, the Green Climate Fund – 
which is struggling to operationalize its 
project funding – plays a part in this 
context. 
The outcomes of the UNFCCC climate 
conference COP24 (Conference of the Par-
ties) in Poland in December 2018 will 
set the tone for 2019, and for 2020, the 
year the Paris Agreement comes into effect. 
For the SIDS and other vulnerable poor 
countries the UN-processes are closely inter-
twined and consistency is imperative. The 
less is achieved at COP24, the more efforts 
have to be undertaken to convince develop-
ing countries and civil society stakeholders 
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that engagement for their cause can also 
function through other forums – the UNSC 
being one of them. 
Constructive contributions to a strong 
rulebook for implementing the Paris Agree-
ment from 2020 – the key deliverable of 
COP24 – are as important as domestic 
action for Germany’s reputation. A signifi-
cant political push for domestic climate 
policy would thus be helpful to underpin 
credibility. 
Improving knowledge 
Better preparedness for climate risks will 
function only with better information flows 
and risk analyses. There is still a need to 
improve the knowledge base on climate 
impacts from different sources and in par-
ticular regions, and to bring that knowledge 
to those who are affected. The special 
report of the IPCC on a 1.5 degrees climate 
change target, expected for release in 
October, will highlight the latest scientific 
insights and will set a mark also for the 
climate and security debate. Exchanges on 
early warning for policymakers seeking to 
prevent crises, and meta-studies on risk con-
stellations in specific regions can further 
improve understanding of where massive 
conflicts are to be expected. Germany 
should disseminate and promote such ex-
pertise to inform debates. With a view to 
the UNSC, this should be included in the 
Groups of Friends agenda and in Arria 
formular meetings. 
Cross-cutting approaches 
The German agenda could also serve to 
more closely connect the debates on pre-
ventive policies in the UN, such as humani-
tarian aid and the implementation of the 
sustainable development goals (SDGs) with 
experiences of institutions inside and out-
side the UN that deal with crises aggravated 
by climate change. Effective SDG imple-
mentation in particular is a building block 
for improving resilience in fragile states. 
Regular reviews of climate action imple-
mentation in the Paris Agreement – the 
first being due in 2023 – will also reveal 
how the big emitters, to which the P5 
belong, follow up on their own promises 
to limit global warming. 
Last but not least, the climate diplomacy 
capacities at the EU level, including the 
Foreign Affairs Council, the European Par-
liament, and the EEAS, need to be activated 
at an early stage to support the German 
agenda at the UNSC and other UN institu-
tions during 2019 and 2020. 
Managing expectations 
The UN system as such is suffering pressure 
from sharp financial cuts and long-standing 
demands for reform. The appetite for new 
institutional arrangements is weak. Pushing 
for Security Council resolutions or state-
ments on climate risks is not a safe bet, and 
the ambition of such attempts is amplified 
by a weak UN system. Still, drawing atten-
tion to climate impacts will maintain the 
pressure on the critical UNSC members, 
where Germany is one of the few countries 
with the standing to make a difference. 
Whether the outcome of Germany’s two-
year stint matches the ambition will de-
pend on the overall political situation at 
the UNSC when an open debate is held as 
much as on the diplomatic resources in-
vested upfront. 
Diplomats will need to prepare for flex-
ibility. Working with the United States 
exemplifies the issues: While the ongoing 
US withdrawal from multilateralism under-
mines the UN system, Germany could 
leverage US national security interests con-
cerning climate risks to engage with US 
representatives in the UNSC. Similarly, for-
mulating common interests of the P5 in the 
Arctic region could be a door-opener, but 
also delicate as long as Arctic neighbour 
Russia is critical of talking about climate 
security at all. 
Germany will need a mix of sound alli-
ance-building with countries in the UNSC 
(like the United States and China, Peru and 
South Africa), sufficient diplomatic re-
sources to follow up across UN institutions 
that are already addressing the risks for 
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fragile states, flexibility of concepts, and 
high-level domestic and European govern-
ment engagement. The German govern-
ment can build on the recent efforts and 
experiences of the Netherlands and Sweden, 
which promoted the debates and tested 
approaches during the past two years, and 
showed how to enhance foreign policy 
infrastructures to achieve impact. Not least, 
Germany can build on its strong reputation 
as a reliable international partner across 
different forums, including G7 and G20, in 
times of weakened multilateralism. 
 
Dr. Susanne Dröge is a Senior Fellow in the Global Issues Division at SWP.  
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